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Protection from genocide has been a common denominator in state rhetoric since 
1948 when the Genocide Convention was adopted. However, state accountability 
for this archetypical crime of the state is virtually non-existent. This paper 
addresses a two-pronged puzzle, namely: (i) why, no government involved in the 
commission of genocide has to-date been held responsible for it; and (ii) how 
legal processes of the sole Court that addresses states’ disputes regarding 
genocide – the International Court of Justice – condition, even limit, the quality of 
decisions taken by the Court with particular reference to state liability for this 
crime. The analysis contributes to an emerging debate on the application of state 
responsibility with reference to the protection from genocide by highlighting 
existing shortcomings pertaining to the interpretation and implementation of the 
Genocide Convention which, in turn, warrants a holistic revision of this treaty. 
 
Introduction 
 
Genocide is no ordinary crime. It has been labeled as “contrary to the spirit and aims of 
the United Nations” and as “an odious scourge,” in the Preamble to the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNTS 1951: 278), hereinafter 
referred to as “the Genocide Convention” or “the Convention”, as well as “the ultimate 
human rights problem” and “the crime of all crimes” (Schabas 2009: 7, 15). Whilst most 
human rights conventions and declarations relate to the individual’s right to life, the 
Genocide Convention is concerned with human groups’ right to life. Resolution 96(I) 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1946 draws this group versus 
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individual rights comparison in most clear terms: “Genocide is a denial of the right of 
existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of 
individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of 
humankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other 
contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the 
spirit and aims of the United Nations” (United Nations 1947a). 
Nearly seventy years since its adoption, the Genocide Convention has been the 
subject of litigation between states and criminal prosecution of individuals before a 
number of international courts and tribunals such as the International Court of Justice 
(hereinafter referred to as “the ICJ” or “the Court”), the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (hereinafter referred to as “the ICTR”), and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as “the ICTY”). There are 
other international courts and tribunals currently seized of genocide cases which have not 
yet been determined. Such is the case of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter 
referred to as the “ICC”). The same applies equally to national courts, such as the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Ciorciari and Heindel 2014). 
However, notwithstanding the institution of these cases, few and far between have been 
those instances where an international court or tribunal has found that genocide has been 
perpetrated by an individual and virtually never by a state. Indeed, judgements delivered 
so far by international courts and tribunals with regard to the application of the Genocide 
Convention indicate that genocide has been found to have been committed in only a 
limited number of cases. In so far as the ICTR is concerned, there have been few such 
occasions when compared to victims’ suffering the first two landmark decisions being: 
 3 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, 2000; and ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu 
2001. At the end of June 2016, the ICTY had determined four genocide decisions: ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, 2004; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al, 2015; 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, 2015; and ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, 
2016. Whilst the ICJ, todate, has delivered only one genocide judgement, namely the 
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (hereinafter 
referred to as Bosnia v. Serbia), (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), 43), though the latter case was 
limited to the obligation to prevent genocide at Srebrenica in 1995 and the ICJ relied 
heavily on evidence produced before the ICTY’s to arrive at that conclusion.  
It is puzzling that although genocide is a collective crime against groups 
inconceivable without the involvement of the state, indeed considered as the archetypical 
crime of the state, no government involved in the commission of genocide has to-date 
been held responsible for this heinous crime. Whilst individual responsibility for 
genocide has been established for a handful of perpetrators, the state on whose behalf 
they operated has not bore the brunt of its criminal enterprise. The Genocide Convention 
imposes some obligations upon states but it does not provide explicitly that states may be 
held responsible for the crime of crimes. The centrepiece of the genocide law, the 
Genocide Convention, posited from a criminal justice perspective, is concerned – 
primarily – with prosecution of individual perpetrators rather than their master sponsor, 
their government. It was hoped that state responsibility for genocide would be finally 
discharged in the latest judgement decided by the ICJ (Bosnia v. Serbia). However, this 
was not the case. Indeed, as shown below, the provisions of the Convention and its 
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technical interpretation afforded by the Court disadvantaged the victim state. Coupled 
with the legal culture of the Court which is more reverential to the doctrine of state 
sovereignty rather than to emphasize the state’s assumption of responsibility for atrocities 
committed, these drawbacks are contributing to the Genocide Convention losing its 
efficacy. 
The second aspect of the “puzzle” or problematique of this paper concerns how 
the ICJ’s legal process conditions the (quality of) decisions taken by the Court. The paper 
considers specifically the ICJ genocide cases with a view to shedding light on the 
limitations inherent in the Convention as well as in the ICJ’s legal culture that are 
contributing to make the infliction of punishment for genocide more difficult to achieve. 
These are noticeable omissions in the existing large inter-disciplinary genocide 
literature,
1
 that are rendering a disservice to victims whilst molding the impression that 
genocidaries can, through legal contortions, avoid the dispensation of justice in their 
regard thereby nullifying the Convention’s objectives. Indeed, with regard to the ICJ, 
there are inherent difficulties in international law, as interpreted and applied by the Court, 
which make it more problematic for the Court to establish state responsibility for 
genocide. This paper aims to address the limitations inherent in the Genocide Convention 
at attributing state responsibility for the worst crime known to humankind, by reference 
to genocide cases decided by the ICJ.  
A review of the judgments delivered by the ICJ in its entire history indicates that 
the Court has dealt with the crime of genocide in only two decided cases, namely Bosnia 
v. Serbia and the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), hereinafter Croatia v. 
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Serbia. In the former case, Bosnia and Herzegovina had requested the Court to adjudge 
Serbia responsible for violations of the Genocide Convention in the context of the 
Bosnian War (1992-1995) (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 64). In the latter case, it was 
Croatia which made a similar request (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 50). Here Serbia 
retorted through a counter-claim by requesting the Court to declare Croatia responsible 
for perpetrating genocide against Croatia’s Serbs (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 51). In 
both cases, Serbia rejected the concept of state criminal responsibility and denied any 
violation of the Genocide Convention. It was only in Bosnia v. Serbia that the ICJ 
established state responsibility for failing to prevent genocide on Serbia’s side even if the 
Court’s failure to find Serbia guilty of the principal crime of genocide, rather than its 
accessory to, of failure to, prevent genocide, did not go as far as the Bosnian party had 
requested and expected from the Court’s ruling. This indeed is perceived by Bosnians 
(who adhere to the idea of Bosnian unity and statehood) as a weakness in the Court’s 
decision that dented the kind of outcome which the Bosnian side expected from those 
judicial proceedings. However, in many ways this was a landmark finding in the history 
of the ICJ that such responsibility was attributed even in a limited way. Nevertheless, this 
was also a case that exposed impediments in attributing state responsibility for the 
commission of genocide. Reasons which can be adduced for limitations inherent in the 
Convention as well as in the ICJ’s legal process pertain to: (a) ambiguities in the 
definition and meaning of genocide; (b) the adoption of a high standard of proof to 
ground state responsibility for genocide; (c) the exclusion by the Genocide Convention of 
the applicability of non-treaty sources of international law; and (d) the lack of a finding 
of state responsibility for offences of a lesser aggravated character than that of genocide. 
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The ensuing analysis begins by engaging with the meaning of state responsibility for 
genocide prior to exploring the above mentioned limitations to the attribution of state 
responsibility for genocide via a close reading of the Convention and the ICJ’s related 
cases.  
 
State Responsibility for Genocide  
 
The concept of “state responsibility” has a fascinating history connected directly with the 
formation of the United Nations and UN discussions on the text of the Genocide 
Convention which makes clear the political and legal intricacies inherent in the term. 
Before referring below to those discussions, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by 
“state” in the context of this contribution. At first glance it may not appear obvious that 
there is an ambiguity pertaining to the definition of state itself because in the wide use of 
the term in various disciplines such as political science, law, sociology, history etc., this 
word is frequently taken for granted. Given its centrality to various disciplines it is not 
surprising that its meaning may vary depending on the nature of the research question and 
the context of analysis. In general, there are two broad conceptions of state: a national-
territorial concept according to which the state comprises the whole territory denoted on a 
map and all which is within it (people, government, resources); and a more limited, 
institutional concept of state. While both conceptions are heuristic abstractions, the most 
appropriate in the context of our analysis is the second, that is, the institutional 
conception of the state. Hence, with Theda Skocpol, we understand “state” to mean: “a 
set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well 
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coordinated, by an executive authority” (Skocpol 1979: 29). Therefore, state 
responsibility for genocide in the context of this paper refers to responsibility of a state’s 
government, administration, or institutions which orchestrated, oversaw, and directed the 
state’s genocide policy. 
 The issue of genocide was first included on the agenda of the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) in its first session on October 1, 1946. Ten days after, the UNGA 
adopted Resolution 96(I) which recognized that genocide is a crime under international 
law, invited Member States to enact legislation for the prevention and punishment of that 
crime, and recommended the drawing up of a convention to be submitted to the General 
Assembly (United Nations 1947a). Work on the drafting of the convention was referred 
to the Sixth UNGA (Legal) Committee. Afterwards, for more than two years, the text of a 
draft resolution on genocide was debated in this Committee, in the Ad Hoc Committee, 
and the General Assembly. From the inception of these discussions controversy pertained 
to the referent of criminal responsibility for genocide. Notably, the representative of the 
United Kingdom – Sir Hartley Shawcross – consistently expressed the view that genocide 
“is an international crime for the commission of which principals and accessories, as well 
as States, are individually responsible” (United Nations 1946a). The UK representative 
reiterated this view – too – in the Sixth Committee meeting of November 17, 1947 
(United Nations 1947b).
2
 Moreover, in a subsequent meeting on October 16, 1948, the 
UK representative – Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice – suggested an amendment to Article V that 
made direct reference to the concept of state responsibility for genocide, apart from that 
of the individual: “Criminal responsibility for any act of genocide as specified in Articles 
II and IV shall extend not only to all private persons or associations, but also to States, 
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Governments, or organs or authorities of the State or Government by whom such acts are 
committed” (United Nations 1948c). Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice argued that both the 
responsibility of governments, and that of private individuals, should be clearly expressed 
in Article V of the Convention (United Nations 1948e). 
 The UN discussions on state responsibility for genocide show that the British 
view that responsibility for genocide ought to belong not only to individuals but also to 
states was endorsed by many governments, for example those of Belgium, Bolivia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Luxemburg, Syria, Venezuela etc., (refer, for instance, to United Nations 
1948e). However, the British view was contested by others. France, for example, 
disputed this view on the ground that French law made no provision for criminal 
responsibility of states (United Nations 1946a). Retention of the concept of governmental 
responsibility in the text of the Genocide Convention was strongly opposed also by 
Brazil, China, Greece, India, Lebanon, Poland etc. (United Nations 1948a; United 
Nations 1948e). In the end, the UK amendment was rejected by a flimsy margin of only 
two votes (twenty-four votes to twenty-two) (United Nations 1948e). The ground for this 
rejection, however, seems to have to do more with the semantics of formulation of “State 
responsibility” rather than the idea itself (United Nations 1948e). However, although the 
United Kingdom’s amendment was defeated by a very thin majority, this does not mean 
that the concept of state responsibility for genocide has been laid to rest. On the contrary, 
the narrow vote indicates that there was agreement between states that the latter may be 
civilly liable therefor. 
 The final consideration of the draft convention in the Sixth Committee led to the 
adoption of the Genocide Convention on December 9, 1948. The adopted text envisaged 
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individual criminal responsibility for genocide but did not provide for state responsibility 
for genocide. Disappointed, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice opined that the Convention 
“approached genocide from the wrong angle, the responsibility of individuals, whereas it 
was really governments that had to be the focus” (United Nations 1948f). Similarly, Sir 
Hartley Shawcross was disenchanted by the prospects of a Convention excluding state 
responsibility for genocide. In his view it was a “complete delusion to suppose that the 
adoption of a convention of the type proposed, even if generally adhered to, would give 
people a greater sense of security or would diminish existing dangers of persecution on 
racial, religious, or national grounds” (United Nations 1948b). 
 Although the Genocide Convention does not provide explicitly that states may be 
held responsible for genocide, the idea that a state can be liable for this crime was 
initially supported by the International Law Commission in its 1976 draft principles on 
state responsibility where Article 19 thereof defines a state crime “an internationally 
wrongful act which resulted from the breach by a state of an international obligation so 
essential for the protection of the fundamental interests of the international community 
that its breach was recognized as a crime by that community as a whole.” According to 
Article 19, “an international crime may result, inter alia, from . . . a serious breach on a 
widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding 
the human being, such as those prohibiting ... genocide.”3 For Law Professor James 
Crawford this is “[t]he single most controversial element in the draft articles on State 
responsibility.”4 The Commission reconsidered the issue of state crimes at its 1998 
session, when it decided that it should “be put to one side” (United Nations 1998b: para. 
331(a)) due to the legal difficulties in placing state crimes within the framework of state 
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responsibility, in establishing the differences between individual and state responsibility, 
and in extending state liability within a civil law context. In the August 2001 version of 
the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, the words “state crime” do not feature at all, though 
James Crawford maintains that there exist international crimes such as aggression and 
genocide “which are committed mainly or only by State agencies” (Crawford 2002: 19). 
 Nonetheless, the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (International Law Commission 2001) hold states responsible for 
internationally wrongful acts (Crawford, Pellet and Olleson 2010). Such acts materialize 
when there is a breach of an international obligation irrespective of whether that 
obligation arises from a treaty, a custom or a peremptory norm. According to Article 53 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, a peremptory norm of 
international law, also known as jus cogens, “is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character.” In the case of genocide, this crime is regulated by all the 
three above-listed sources of international law and hence state responsibility for the crime 
of genocide is threefold (though this paper presents its analysis from a strictly 
conventional approach). A state manifests its conduct through a person or a group of 
persons who act on the “instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State” 
(International Law Commission 2001: Article 8). 
As the history of the debate on state responsibility in the process of drafting the 
Genocide Convention reviewed above shows, although the state has been considered to 
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be the main perpetrator of genocide, the Convention does not make explicit that 
commission of that crime entails state responsibility, complicity, or involvement. The 
ICJ, nevertheless, has finally ruled that states may commit genocide and the other acts 
enumerated in Article III of the Genocide Convention, and therefore incur the 
responsibility for this crime (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 168-169, 174 and 471, sub-para. 
(5)). Moreover, the Court has stated that it “will have recourse not only to the Convention 
itself, but also to the rules of general international law ... on responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts” (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 149). In many ways this is a 
landmark pronouncement that raises hopes for attribution of state responsibility for 
genocide, although these hopes did not fully materialize in the judgements referred to in 
this analysis.  
In legal parlance “responsibility” is frequently used interchangeably with 
“obligation” or “duty”. The United Nations Convention enshrines the concept of positive 
obligations when it refers to a state’s responsibility to prevent genocide. Human Rights 
Law – more recent to, and following on the path of, the Genocide Convention – also 
sanctifies the concept of “positive obligations” (Akandji-Kombe 2007). States do not 
have only an obligation to ensure that they do not commit breaches of Human Rights 
Law but also a positive obligation to take the necessary measures to safeguard human 
rights. A state has indeed a proactive duty to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights 
rather than restrict itself to simply punish a violation of human rights through coercive 
force after the crime would have been executed. In concrete form, the state’s positive 
obligation to prevent genocide takes the form of: (a) the duty to protect life; (b) the taking 
 12 
of positive measures; and (c) the duty to investigate and prosecute (Harris, O’Boyle, 
Bates and Buckley 2009: 36-46; 48-52).  
The Genocide Convention, to its credit, embraced positive obligations before this 
concept matured in Human Rights Law and developed to the extent that it is known today 
(Mowbray 2004; Xenos 2012). The Convention in Article I imposes a responsibility on 
states to prohibit genocide as evident in the Convention’s title, and also in the very 
opening provision of the Convention whereby the Contracting Parties pledge to prevent 
genocide. Moreover, the Genocide Convention in Article VIII empowers Contracting 
Parties “to call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action 
under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention 
and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the acts enumerated in Article III” (ICJ, 
Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 425-432).  
Central to Bosnia v. Serbia was the issue whether a State could perpetrate 
genocide rendering itself liable and in breach of the Convention. A detailed summary of 
Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia cases is not easy to provide in the limited space 
available here. In brief, Bosnia contended that following the break-up of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Serbia had committed atrocities with the intent 
to destroy in whole or in part the protected group of Bosnian Muslims. Relying on ICTY 
evidence, the ICJ confirmed that the SFRY government in Belgrade had provided 
considerable support to Republika Srpska (the self-proclaimed Republic of the Serb 
People of Bosnia). The Court found that massive killings were perpetrated during the 
Bosnian War but the specific genocidal intent on the part of the perpetrators was missing. 
It is only in the massacre of Srebrenica of July 11-19, 1995 – where more than 7,000 
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Bosnian Muslim man and boys were killed by the Serb forces – that genocidal intent can 
be discerned the Court found. Hence, the Srebrenica massacre was qualified as genocide. 
Nevertheless, the specific intent to destroy Muslims in the entire Bosnia was not 
conclusively established by the ICJ. The Court decided that Serbia had not committed 
genocide, nor conspired to commit genocide, nor incited the commission of genocide, nor 
was it complicit in genocide. But Serbia had violated the obligation to prevent genocide 
in Srebrenica (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007). In the other ICJ genocide case of  Croatia v. 
Serbia, Croatia maintained that Croat Serb forces and the Yugoslav National Army who 
opposed the independence of Croatia perpetrated genocide against Croat people living in 
the so-called Krajina Republic – comprising around one-third of Croatian territory 
controlled by the Serb military – between 1991 and 1995. As in Bosnia v. Serbia, 
evidence of genocidal intent was to be sought, first, in the State’s policy, but it could also 
be inferred from a pattern of conduct, where such intent is the only reasonable inference 
to be drawn from the acts in question. It was for the party alleging a fact – i.e., genocide – 
to demonstrate its existence. The Court established the actus reus of genocide but that the 
intentional element of genocide was lacking, and accordingly rejected Croatia’s claim in 
its entirety (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 441).  
Many observers and victims’ relatives had hoped that the ICJ would establish 
Serbia’s state responsibility for genocide in Bosnia, or at least in Srebrenica where 
genocide was judiciously proven to have occurred especially since the ICJ affirmed that 
states can commit genocide. Moreover, the ICJ relied heavily on ICTY evidence that 
showed beyond reasonable doubt the very large extent of military and financial aid Serbia 
granted her ethnic brethrens in Bosnia. In finding Serbia guilty for not preventing 
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genocide in Bosnia v. Serbia, the ICJ ruled on an aspect of state responsibility – 
responsibility to prevent – that remains quite undeveloped, since the duties related thereto 
are not set out with precision by the Convention. 
A careful reading of the Convention indicates that its main thrust is placed on 
punishment rather than on prevention. The various forms of genocidal acts, its mens rea, 
the types of genocidal crimes and other matters related to the commission of the crime of 
genocide in its differing manifestations are set out in detail in the Convention. Yet the 
positive obligation consisting in state responsibility to prevent the perpetration of 
genocide is left in essence within the discretion of the Contracting Parties to determine 
how to apply it in practice. The Court has contributed to the elucidation of this obligation 
as one of conduct, not one of success, in preventing genocide. As the ICJ has held, a 
“State does not incur responsibility because the desired result is not achieved” (ICJ, 
Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 430). Further, states are however required to use their “capacity to 
influence effectively the actions of persons likely to commit, or [are] already committing, 
genocide” (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 430). But a state is held responsible for breaching 
the obligation to prevent genocide only when genocide actually takes place (ICJ, Bosnia 
v. Serbia 2007: 431).  
Although the duty of states to prevent genocide is mentioned in Article I, the 
Convention is conspicuous by its absence of developing such obligation, leaving it within 
the discretion of Contracting Parties to implement this requirement. Should such Parties 
fail to comply with this obligation, then it is upon the international society of states to 
carry forward this duty according to Article VIII of the Convention. Preventive measures 
can take the form of non-judicial and judicial measures as enumerated in Article 33 of the 
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United Nations Charter but the Convention does not make reference to such measures. 
Nonetheless, when preventive diplomacy fails, recourse to coercive measures can be had 
in accordance with the UN Charter, as dictated by Article VIII of the Convention. But at 
this stage the harm would have already been done, the breach of an international 
obligation sustained, and – in all probability – the injury suffered would be irremediable.  
 
Ambiguities Related to, and Limitations in, the Definition of Genocide 
 
This paper contributes to an emerging debate on the application of state responsibility 
with reference to the protection from the crime of genocide by highlighting existing 
limitations pertaining to the interpretation and implementation of the Genocide 
Convention. One such difficulty lies precisely in the ambiguities raised by, and the 
limitations inherent in, the wording of the Convention with regard to the definition of 
“genocide.” Genocide is defined in Article II of the Convention as:  
… any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
5
 (a) killing 
members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group. 
  This definition is ambiguous on various counts.  
First, there is the problem of establishing the perpetrators’ special genocidal 
intent, the mens rea of genocide consisting in the dolus specialis, which has been 
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interpreted by the ICTY (The Prosecutor v. Kayishema et al 1999: 91) and by the ICJ in 
Bosnia v. Serbia as being required by the Convention to ground genocide. The same 
applies to requiring the group’s destruction in part as meaning “considerable” when this 
interpretation is not evident from the Convention’s wording (Kent 2013: 577-578). The 
mental element consists in terms of Article II of the Convention in the “intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such” coupled with 
the intent to commit the individual acts concerned enumerated in Article II, paragraphs 
(a) to (e) of the Genocide Convention. Yet, what seems at face value to be straight 
forward is far from being so. Difficulties in interpretation have arisen, even as lately as 
2015, with regard to Article II of the Convention before the ICJ in Croatia v. Serbia on 
three main issues: “(1) on the meaning and scope of ‘destruction’ of a group, (2) on the 
meaning of destruction of a group ‘in part’, and finally (3) on what constitutes the 
evidence of the dolus specialis” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 133).6 In this respect, the 
Court was requested to rule whether destruction was limited to physical or biological 
destruction of the group, thereby excluding “the intent to stop it from functioning as a 
unit” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 133). The ICJ ruled in favor of this limitation. In 
doing so, the Court relied on the decisions delivered by the ICTY and the ICTR not only 
with regard to the physical destruction of the group but also as to the targeted group, 
genocide and lesser crimes, the actus reus of genocide, and the definition of genocide. 
The Court was also asked as to whether the extermination of the group was required to 
which it ruled that it was difficult to establish the genocidal intent “on the basis of 
isolated acts” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 139) and that there had to be destruction of 
“the group itself in whole or in part” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 139). As to what 
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constitutes the meaning of destruction of the group “in part” as opposed to “in full”, the 
Court opined that the targeted part of a protected group had to be “substantial in relation 
to the overall group.” In establishing what constitutes a substantial part of the particular 
group, the Court looked at “the quantitative element and evidence regarding the 
geographic location and prominence of the allegedly targeted part of the group” (ICJ, 
Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 198; ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 142). The Court also defined the 
target group positively, that is, not “negatively as the ‘non-Serb’ population”7 (ICJ, 
Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 196) and required the consideration of the opportunity available to 
the alleged perpetrator to commit genocide within a geographically limited area as being 
material to establish the dolus specialis (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 199). The Court has 
adopted a qualitative criterion in establishing genocide: “If a specific part of the group is 
emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding 
that the part qualifies as substantial” (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 200). Finally, as to the 
evidence required of the dolus specialis, the Court considers that it should be manifest in 
a state’s declared policy (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 143; Browning 2004: 374-415); 
Götz 1999: 243-263 and 264-272; Hochstadt 2004: 5) or, in the absence of such 
declaration, is “established by indirect evidence, that is, deduced or inferred from certain 
types of conduct” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 148). With regard to the former, that is, 
evidence of genocidal intent, it can be found in official state policy, as has been 
established in other genocide cases most prominently in the case of the Holocaust with 
reference to the Final Solution, Nazi Germany’s declared policy on the extermination of 
the Jews. As to the latter, the Court “accepted the possibility of genocidal intent being 
established indirectly by inference” through the notion of reasonableness, that is, “it is 
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necessary and sufficient that this is the only inference that could reasonably be drawn 
from the acts in question” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 148).  
All the above judicial interpretations of the genocidal intent are fundamental to 
the application of the Genocide Convention. Yet such fundamental interpretations should 
not have been left to the Court to determine but to the Contracting Parties to adopt them 
in full, or subject to such modification/s that they deem necessary, in a Protocol to the 
Genocide Convention. Furthermore, it is to be observed that the Genocide Convention 
was concluded in 1948 and since then, a number of international and national courts and 
tribunals have had the opportunity to interpret its provisions, but no holistic revision of 
the Genocide Convention has ever taken place in this period within the UN General 
Assembly, its creator, notwithstanding the various occurrences of genocide since the end 
of the Second World War. Second, the Genocide Convention does not quantify the 
targeted group, that is, the actual size thereof. If the group is atomized to the level of a 
town or village, this would have the potential disadvantage of classifying non-genocidal 
cases as genocides. The ICJ seems to have averted this incongruence by stating that the 
group has to be “substantial in relation to the overall group” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 
142).  However, the “substantial” feature of the group is left undefined by the 
Convention. The judicial classification of the group on a case by case basis does not bring 
about either the needed clarity or uniformity of the definition of the group.
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Third, the Genocide Convention (or international law, for that matter) does not 
distinguish between genocide and lesser crimes such as ethnic cleansing. In terms of the 
Convention, ethnic cleansing has no legal significance of its own. No universally agreed 
definition of “ethnic cleansing” therefore exists but scholars, journalists, and policy 
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makers frequently use the term to refer to a deliberate policy pursuit with the aim of 
removing and dispossessing an undesirable indigenous population (defined on ethno-
national terms) by means of force and/or intimidation (Mulaj 2008: 4). Ethnic cleansing 
is not necessarily genocide although the ICJ has admitted that there can be situations 
where ethnic cleansing may satisfy the constitutive elements of genocide. The Court 
opines that:  
This is not to say that acts described as “ethnic cleansing” may never 
constitute genocide, if they are such as to be characterized as, for example, 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction “in whole or in part”, contrary to Article II, paragraph 
(c), of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with the necessary 
specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the destruction of 
the group, as distinct from its removal from the region . . . In other words, 
whether a particular operation described as “ethnic cleansing” amounts to 
genocide depends on the presence or absence of acts listed in Article II of the 
Genocide Convention, and of the intent to destroy the group as such (ICJ, 
Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 190). 
Ethnic cleansing, contrary to genocide, cannot be prosecuted in its own right for 
international criminal law does not recognize an international crime of ethnic cleansing. 
However, some of its constitutive elements may fall under sub-divisions of international 
criminal law such as crimes against humanity or war crimes and, where there is the 
genocidal intent, the actus reus of ethnic cleansing may fall under the crime of genocide 
despite the fact that the mens rea of ethnic cleansing does not.  
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Further, ethnic cleansing may, in certain situations, point towards the specific 
intent required to prove that genocidal acts have taken place. It is indeed here that 
international law appears to complicate matters for an applicant state before the ICJ 
attempting to obtain a declaration from the Court of state responsibility for genocide by 
the respondent state because, although it recognizes genocide as the crime of all crimes, 
international law fails to recognize ethnic cleansing as a separate and distinct crime in its 
own right rather than as an appendage to the crime of genocide or to other international 
crimes. In addition, although the Convention correctly penalizes genocide, it can be 
extremely difficult for the ICJ to attribute state responsibility for the crime of genocide, 
due to the doctrine of precedent adopted by the ICJ which requires it to adopt a high 
standard of proof to ground state responsibility for genocide, as explained in the 
following section. The contradiction thus lies in the fact that whilst genocide is an 
international crime, state perpetrators may run scot free on two counts: first, because the 
probative standard to meet it is too high and, second, because if genocide cannot be 
proved due to the high probative standard required by the ICJ from the applicant state, the 
said state cannot rely on the lesser offence of ethnic cleansing once the latter conduct 
does not, in itself, amount to an international or domestic crime, and the Genocide 
Convention does not allow the ICJ to find state responsibility for a lesser offence even if 
the Court finds in its judgment responsibility for such lesser offence but not for genocide.  
Fourth, the actus reus of genocide has given rise to ambiguities in its 
interpretation which the ICJ has attempted to resolve. The Convention, in Article II, 
stipulates that the actus reus may take the form of five distinct and separate acts. The 
Court has had occasion, in its case law, to interpret some of these genocidal acts. 
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Genocide is a collective crime in the sense that victims are part of a group defined, in the 
words of Article II of the Convention, as “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” 
(Willem-Jan 2010: 29-32). The word “killing” in the genocidal act of “killing members of 
the group” in Article II(a) of the Convention refers “to the act of intentionally killing 
members of the group” (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 186-187; and ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 
2015: 156). The issue which arose before the ICJ with regard to the second genocidal act 
is what constitutes “serious” bodily or mental harm to members of the group. The Court 
interprets “serious” as referring to bodily or mental harm which contributes “to the 
physical or biological destruction of the group, in whole or in part” (ICJ, Croatia v. 
Serbia 2015: 157). Rape and other acts of sexual violence are considered by the Court as 
falling under this genocidal act (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 159). Furthermore, the 
Court’s view is that “the persistent refusal of the competent authorities to provide 
relatives of individuals who disappeared in the context of an alleged genocide with 
information in their possession, which would enable the relatives to establish with 
certainty whether those individuals are dead, and if so, how they died, is capable of 
causing psychological suffering”, but the said harm “must be such as to contribute to the 
physical or biological destruction of the group, in whole or in part” (ICJ, Croatia v. 
Serbia, 2015: 160). As to the genocidal act of “deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, 
the ICJ has held that this covers “physical destruction, other than killing, whereby the 
perpetrator ultimately seeks the death of the members of the group.” (ICJ, Croatia v. 
Serbia 2015: 161). It also considers forced displacements which take place “in such 
circumstances that they were calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the 
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group” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 163) as falling under this genocidal act. Another 
genocidal act is “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” which 
the ICJ has interpreted to mean that “rape and other acts of sexual violence” constitute 
the actus reus of genocide, if “they are of a kind which prevents birth within the group. In 
order for that to be the case, it is necessary that the circumstances of the commission of 
those acts, and their consequences, are such that the capacity of members of the group to 
procreate is affected” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia, 2015: 166). Once Contracting Parties have 
raised these ambiguities in the interpretation of the actus reus of genocide and the ICJ has 
attempted to clarify the Convention, it would be appropriate if these clarifications are 
approved by the said Parties through specific amendment to the Convention to support 
and give more weight to the Court’s interpretation. 
 
Standard of Proof to Ground State Responsibility for Genocide 
 
The standard of proof varies from one international court and tribunal to another. There is 
thus no consistency and uniformity in the standard of proof adopted by diverse 
international courts and tribunals. The ICJ follows a strict stare decisis approach and will 
not “depart from previous findings, particularly when similar issues were dealt with in its 
earlier decisions … unless it finds very particular reasons to do so” (ICJ, Croatia v. 
Serbia 2015: 125). This means it is very difficult, not to say well-nigh impossible, for the 
Court to alter its standard of proof in genocide cases unless, of course, the matter is dealt 
with through an amendment to the Genocide Convention. It also means that the standard 
of proof is case law driven not imposed upon the Court by the Contracting Parties to the 
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Genocide Convention. In so far as the ICJ is concerned, it had established its standard of 
proof in the Corfu Channel Case (ICJ, United Kingdom v. Albania 1949: 16-17). The 
ICJ’s standard of proof requires a threefold test to be met. It has: (a) “to constitute 
decisive legal proof”; (b) to be “conclusive evidence”; and (c) once “[a] charge of such 
exceptional gravity against a State [is made, it] would require a degree of certainty that 
has not been reached here” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 125). In sum, the three-pronged 
standard of proof established by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case and applied in that 
case and subsequent ones, has to be decisive, conclusive and certain, and well beyond 
proof beyond reasonable doubt, simply because the international actors involved are 
states and because the ICJ follows a strict stare decisis approach without departing from 
previous findings in relation to the standard of proof. The ICJ has restated this standard of 
proof in its more recent case law on genocide using the term “fully conclusive” evidence 
to sum up these three ingredients into a comprehensive one (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007 
and ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015).
9
 The ICJ’s high standard applies to states, contrary to 
the international criminal courts and tribunals which apply a lower standard to individuals 
prosecuted before them. The considerations in the Corfu Channel Case should be 
understood in the light of the fact that this judgment was the very first case to be decided 
by the ICJ at a time when the Court was still in the process of asserting its newly acquired 
authority vis-à-vis states, and adopting what today can be viewed as an over cautious 
approach to ensure that Contracting Parties to the ICJ Statute are put at ease and made 
comfortable enough to participate in proceedings before the Court. 
All the three above-cited cases decided by the ICJ
10
 demonstrate that the 
Convention has been interpreted by the Court as requiring an extremely high standard of 
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proof. Whilst the burden of proof is placed on the party who alleges a fact (ICJ, Croatia 
v. Serbia 2015: 173), or as the Court put it, “it is for the party alleging a fact to 
demonstrate its existence” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 172), the standard of proof has 
been established not as one on a balance of probabilities, or proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, as is usually the case in national civil or criminal procedure respectively, but at a 
much higher level of “evidence that is fully conclusive” (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 
209). 
In accordance with the ICJ’s statement that “[s]tate responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility are governed by different legal regimes and pursue different aims” 
(ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 129), the Court enshrines this statement in its judgment 
when it passes on to apply a higher standard of proof to establish state responsibility than 
international criminal courts and tribunals do with regard to identifying individual 
criminal responsibility. In this connection, the Court draws a distinction between state 
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility: “The former concerns the 
consequences of the breach by a State of the obligation imposed upon it by international 
law, whereas the latter is concerned with the responsibility of an individual as established 
under the rules of international and domestic criminal law, and the resultant sanctions to 
be imposed upon that person” (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 129).  
Although this distinction is legally sound, the same cannot be said with regard to 
the standard of proof. Within a national court scenario, the standard of proof varies 
depending on the nature or subject-matter of the dispute. If the case is a criminal one, the 
standard of proof to be resorted to is proof beyond reasonable doubt; if the case is a civil 
one, the standard of proof resorted to is proof on a balance of probability. The criminal 
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law standard is by far more stringent than that of civil law. Nonetheless, such stringency 
does make sense within a criminal law context as the punishment to be meted out can 
include, and normally would include in the case of conviction for the crime of genocide, 
deprivation of liberty through imprisonment. In a civil case, if a state is found to be 
responsible, normally reparations would have to be made good to the other state through 
the liquidation of damages. In the realm of international law, however, whilst 
international criminal courts and tribunals adopt the reasonable beyond doubt standard on 
the same lines as national criminal courts do, the International Court of Justice as an 
international civil court does not apply the standard of proof on a balance of probability 
but proof by fully conclusive evidence. Furthermore, the ICJ has not limited such proof to 
“conclusive evidence” but “proof by fully conclusive evidence.” The standard of “proof 
by conclusive evidence” is already high let alone “proof by fully conclusive evidence.” 
Whilst “proof by conclusive evidence” might be equated to proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, “proof by fully conclusive evidence” requires a higher standard of proof which 
does not allow any doubt or uncertainty as to state responsibility. 
The standard of proof by fully conclusive evidence, adopted by the Court in the 
1949 Corfu Channel judgment, is neither established in the Genocide Convention, nor in 
the ICJ Statute. Instead it is entirely case law driven. Moreover, given that proving a case 
by the applicant state against the respondent state constitutes an onerous task, applying 
“proof by fully conclusive evidence” might serve as a disincentive for a state to bring a 
dispute against another state before the ICJ. The number of cases brought before the ICJ 
are indeed on the low side and perhaps the time has arrived to revisit the standard of 
proof in order to remove barriers for states to make better use of the contentious 
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jurisdiction of the Court. In short, the standard of proof related to genocide varies from 
one international court to another. As explained, the ICJ adopts the “evidence by fully 
conclusive standard of proof.” But this is not the standard adopted before international 
judicial bodies such as the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC, which consistently adopt the 
proof beyond reasonable doubt standard. The latter has been defined by Lord Denning as 
follows:  
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of a 
doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful 
possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong 
against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be 
dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible but not in the least 
probable” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of 
that will suffice (KBD, Miller v. Ministry of Pensions 1947: 372). 
The inconsistency regarding standard of proof runs the risk of limiting the 
attribution of state responsibility for genocide.  
 Although the raising of the evidentiary bar setting extremely high standards of 
proof for genocide is characteristic of the ICJ, it is emulated by other international 
tribunals. As Gregory Kent observes when discussing the decisions of the ICTR and the 
ICTY: “in some cases, there are ‘prosecutorial omissions and errors as well as a tendency 
on the part of the judges to require that the prosecution meet higher evidentiary standards 
in these cases than in other types of cases”’ which are “illustrative of certain narrowing 
developments in case law” (Kent 2013: 573-574). Furthermore Kent notes that “the idea, 
in Bosnia at least, that a plan of action directed at the destruction of non-Serb groups 
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needed further evidence to be proven beyond all reasonable doubt seems farcical to the 
victims and equally far-fetched to academic experts” (Kent 2013: 576). Once more, an 
excessive standard of proof contributes directly to limiting attribution of responsibility 
for genocide. 
 
Exclusions made by the Genocide Convention regarding Sources of International 
Law and Finding of State Responsibility for a Lesser Offence 
 
First, Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute is considered to be declaratory of the sources of 
public international law. It provides that:  
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.  
Although such sources are not arranged in a hierarchical order, the first three 
sources of international law, that is, treaty law, custom and jus cogens are a primary 
source of international law whilst the other two sources (judicial decisions and the 
writings of publicists) are a subsidiary source of international law. In so far as the 
 28 
primary sources are concerned, they are of equal value and are not placed in a 
hierarchical order amongst themselves. Hence, it cannot be argued that treaty law is 
superior to both customary law and jus cogens and that customary law is, in turn, superior 
to jus cogens. In other words, all three sources are of equal weight although treaty law 
normally tends to be better ascertainable than the other two sources of international law. 
Nonetheless, the international crime of genocide is perhaps one of those very few 
international crimes which can claim to have as its source conventional law, customary 
law and a peremptory norm status. The subsidiary sources of international law are also 
relevant for understanding this international crime.
11
 Although there are five sources of 
international law, the text of the Genocide Convention refers only to the primary source 
of treaty law as contained in the Convention. The other primary and secondary sources of 
international law are not referred to by the Genocide Convention. This emanates from a 
reading of Article IX of the Convention which stipulates that:  
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating 
to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts 
enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of 
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
The above Article refers to disputes “relating to the interpretation, application or 
fulfilment” not of the five sources of international law but only “of the present 
Convention.” It is only in this limited case that the ICJ has jurisdiction to decide 
“disputes between the Contracting Parties.” It is therefore not automatic for the Court to 
decide a dispute between Contracting Parties on the basis of non-treaty provisions. On the 
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contrary, once a treaty has been identified as applying to that dispute, the Court will 
decide that dispute in terms of that treaty even if, for instance, there might have been a 
rule of customary international law which would have displaced that treaty or a 
peremptory norm which would have abrogated a treaty provision. This is because (a) 
Article IX allows the ICJ to settle a dispute by having recourse only to treaty law (“the 
present Convention”) and (b) article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute does not apply any 
hierarchical relationship between the primary sources of international law inter se. This, 
it is contended, constitutes a serious limitation imposed upon the Court by the 
Contracting States to the Convention. The Genocide Convention should be flexible 
enough to allow the Court to have recourse to all the sources of international law even 
though these might not be conventional law provided that such sources do not run counter 
to conventional law but supplement it. The ICJ has both in Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia 
v. Serbia correctly taken the view that its jurisdiction was limited to conventional law, 
thereby precluding it from resorting to other primary sources of international law (ICJ, 
Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 129). In sum, the Court’s position is that: “the text is quite clear 
that the jurisdiction for which it provides is confined to disputes regarding the 
interpretation, application or fulfillment of the Convention, including disputes relating to 
the responsibility of a State for genocide or other acts prohibited by the Convention” 
(ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 88). 
Second, the Genocide Convention does not allow the conviction in a criminal trial 
of an accused or the finding of state responsibility in the case of a state in a dispute with 
another state before the ICJ, of an offence of a less aggravated character than that of 
genocide. Indeed, the ICJ has held that it “has no power to rule on alleged breaches of 
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other obligations under international law, not amounting to genocide, particularly those 
protecting human rights in armed conflict. That is so even if the alleged breaches are of 
obligations under peremptory norms, or of obligations which protect essential 
humanitarian values, and which may be owed erga omnes” (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 
147). As can be seen from the two cases decided by the ICJ related to armed conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia namely, those of Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia, the Court 
limited itself to deciding whether there was a case of state responsibility for genocide. 
But the Court did not consider – and in fact was precluded from doing so in terms of 
Article IX of the Convention – whether the criminal conduct in question could have 
amounted to an offence of a lesser aggravated character or a lesser offence. This means 
that although the Court might be of the view that genocide might not have been 
committed in terms of the Convention, it could still decide that a lesser offence might 
have been perpetrated if the impediment of Article IX of the Convention is removed. For 
instance, in Croatia v Serbia, the Court found that there was the actus reus of genocide 
but the special intention of genocide was lacking. Thus, where the Court found that rape 
had occurred but could not find proof for the genocidal intent, rather than declaring that 
Serbia had not committed genocide, it could have declared that Serbia was still guilty of a 
lesser aggravated offence if there existed no such conventional hindrance in Article IX of 
the Convention (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 158). In this way, although justice would be 
meted out to the respondent state which would end up not being declared responsible for 
genocide perpetration, justice would still be done with the victims of crime, because the 
respondent State would have been declared responsible for the commission of a crime of 
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a lesser nature than that of genocide rather than being absolved of state responsibility as 
happened in the instant case.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Although genocide is inconceivable without state complicity or involvement, no state 
involved in the occurrence of genocide has been held responsible to-date, except for 
Serbia which the ICJ found to have been in breach of its obligation to prevent genocide in 
Bosnia (ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007: 471). The centerpiece of the genocide law – the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – does not even 
explicitly provide that states may be responsible for genocide. Posited from a criminal 
justice perspective the Convention is aimed at individual perpetrators rather than states, 
although perpetrators act as agents of the state. We believe that this narrowing of the 
referent of responsibility is damaging for the punishment and prevention of genocide. 
Governments ought to answer for their genocidal actions.  
Sir Hartley Shawcross and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice were right to suggest during the 
UN discussions on the drafting of the Convention that responsibility for genocide should 
be vested both with states and individuals and that for the Convention to be effective it 
ought to approach genocide from the angle of governments not merely individuals 
(United Nations 1948b; United Nations 1948f). As explained above, the narrow defeat of 
the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom to explicitly include in the text of the 
Convention that states may be held responsible for genocide, does not equate with the 
defeat of the idea of state responsibility. From a justice point of view, it is anathema to 
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punish few state officials who perpetrated, or were complicit in, genocide without 
holding responsible the government which ordered it. At a time when the principle of 
Responsibility to Protect has made inroads into the UN and foreign policies of many 
countries (Bellamy 2014; Bellamy and Dunne 2016), it is ironic that responsibility for the 
worst crime known to humankind is not attributable to the state/s involved in its 
commission. In our opinion, a revised Convention should clarify that states may be held 
responsible for genocide, in addition to individuals, in view of the fact that in the vast 
majority of cases genocide is carried out with a state’s connivance or its direct 
solicitation. The paper therefore contributes to an emerging debate on the application of 
state responsibility with reference to the protection from the crime of genocide by 
highlighting existing limitations pertaining to the interpretation and implementation of 
the Genocide Convention. 
This paper has considered too the correlation between court practice and legal 
content in the ICJ’s setting. It has paid attention to the ICJ’s legal procedure and its 
impact on the quality of the Court’s decisions pertaining to state responsibility for 
genocide. Several limitations are identified which make difficult the attribution of state 
responsibility under the Genocide Convention.  
A careful reading of the Genocide Convention reveals shortcomings which hinder 
the proper prosecution and effective punishment of this crime. These deficiencies have 
been discussed above and, in sum, consist principally: in the lack of the Genocide 
Convention to articulate in detail the ingredients of positive responsibility, that is, state 
responsibility to prevent the commission of genocide, although the Convention’s 
rendering of negative responsibility (punishment of genocide perpetrators) is better 
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expressed; ambiguities related to, and limitations in, the precise definition of genocide; 
the adoption of a high standard of proof to ground state responsibility for this crime 
which in turn makes it highly improbable to attribute state responsibility for commission 
of genocide, thus undermining its punishment (that is attribution of negative 
responsibility); the exclusions made by the Genocide Convention regarding sources of 
International Law whereby the Convention specifically precludes the Court from 
resorting to other primary sources of international law such as customary international 
law and jus cogens even if these make wider provision in relation to genocide; and the 
impossibility for the Court under the Genocide Convention to find state responsibility for 
a lesser offence than that of genocide. For so long as the above-identified lacunae in the 
United Nations Genocide Convention continue to persist, it is very likely that 
genocidaires and their respective states will continue to evade justice and violate 
fundamental human rights. It is of the essence that state leaders are not allowed to hide 
behind state immunity from prosecution before the ICC or other international and 
national tribunals or for their state to protect them by either not approving their 
extradition to face trial before an international criminal court or tribunal or not 
prosecuting them domestically. Moreover, the Genocide Convention needs to be 
amended to allow the ICJ to find state responsibility for a less serious offence than that of 
genocide such as ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. A new 
provision could be introduced in the Convention to interpret the standard of proof to 
attribute state responsibility as one of “proof beyond reasonable doubt.” Otherwise, the 
pitching of the standard of proof at a very high level is tantamount to limiting the 
attribution of state responsibility for genocide.  
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Although this paper is concerned primarily with the issue of agency pertaining to 
states, its analysis may contribute to open an interdisciplinary debate with the view of a 
possible broadening of agency beyond states and individuals in attributing criminal 
responsibility for genocide to include also violent non-state actors which may be involved 
in the perpetration of this crime. Indeed, there is a gap in literature to be filled by future 
research in so far as the Convention is missing recent empirical developments, for 
instance, where violent non-state actors commit genocide. It appears that the so-called 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fil 'Irāq wa ash-Shām, 
known also as the “Islamic State”) is moving in that direction committing vicious, 
persistent attacks against civilians in Iraq and Syria. Such a situation cannot remain 
unaddressed by the Convention. Violent non-state actors have to be brought within the 
fold of the Convention’s punitive provisions apart from punishing their leaders and 
fighters on the basis of individual criminal liability.
12
 
If the provisions of the Genocide Convention continue to make it difficult to 
attribute responsibility for the most heinous crime to a state, or violent group involved in 
its commission, this bodes worse for a state to implement its positive obligation to 
prevent genocide and negative obligation to punish this crime in order to safeguard the 
right of existence of human groups. Unless the Genocide Convention is amended, it will 
continue to be very difficult for the ICJ to condemn a state for its responsibility in the 
perpetration of genocide thereby reducing the effective deterrent for states which may 
elect to walk that atrocious criminal route. This paper has thus raised some concerns 
regarding interpretive and procedural deficiencies pertaining to the protection from the 
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perpetration of genocide which deserve to be addressed in order to ensure that the worst 
crime known to humankind is punished with the full rigor of the law.  
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introduced the term “genocide” in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. New York: Columbia 
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SCHABAS, William A. (2009). Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). Meierhenrich, Jens. (2014). Genocide: A Reader. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). Chalk, Frank and Jonassohn, Kurt. (1990). The History and Sociology of Genocide, (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press).  
2
 It was because genocide is essentially committed by or with the connivance of the States / Governments 
that Sir Hartley Shawcross opined that the crime of genocide should not be left to the jurisdiction of 
national courts since the latter are unlikely to take effective measures for the suppression of genocide. Refer 
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to Sir Hartley Shawcross remarks in the Sixty-Fourth meeting in Paris, October 1, 1948 (United Nations 
1948b). 
3
 United Nations, “Draft Articles on State Responsibility”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1980, Vol. II (Part 2), Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its thirty-second 
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 United Nations, “First Report on State Responsibility by Mr James Crawford, Special Rapporteur”. 
Addendum UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.1, para. 43 (United Nations 1988a). 
5
 The specific intent to destroy the group “as such” has been explained by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. 
Radovan Karadžić as follows: 
551. The specific intent to destroy the group “as such” makes genocide an exceptionally 
grave crime and distinguishes it from other serious crimes, such as persecutions as a crime 
against humanity. The term “as such” has great significance as it shows that the crime of 
genocide requires intent to destroy a collection of people because of their particular group 
identity based on nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion. (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan 
Karadžić, 2016: 551). 
6
 This point has been reiterated by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić:  
549. The mens rea required for the crime of genocide—“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” … — has been referred to variously as, for 
instance, special intent, specific intent, dolus specialis, particular intent and genocidal intent. 
Genocide requires not only proof of intent to commit the alleged acts of genocide, but also 
proof of the specific intent to destroy the protected group, in whole or in part. (ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, 2016: 549).  
7
 The ICTY, on this point, has held that:  
541. The group targeted for genocide thus cannot be defined in terms of a negative 
characteristic, such as “non-Serbs” for instance. (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, 
2016: 541). 
8 The criterion of establishing the group, on a case by case basis, has been reasserted by the ICTY in its 
recent decision of Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: 
541. The determination of the composition of the group is necessarily made on a case-by-
case basis. When more than one group is targeted, the elements of the crime of genocide 
must be considered in relation to each group separately. (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radovan 
Karadžić, 2016: 541). 
9
 In its 2007 judgment in the Bosnia v. Serbia, the ICJ established the following:  
209. The Court has long recognized that claims against a State involving charges of 
exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive. The Court requires 
that it be fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings, that the crime of genocide 
or the other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed, have been clearly 
established. The same standard applies to the proof of attribution for such acts.  
210. In respect of the Applicant’s claim that the Respondent has breached its undertakings to 
prevent genocide and to punish and extradite persons charged with genocide, the Court 
requires proof at a high level of certainty appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation. 
(ICJ, United Kingdom v. Albania 1949: 16-17).  
This passage was quoted with approval in the ICJ Croatia v. Serbia 2015 judgment:  
The Court, after recalling that “claims against a State involving charges of exceptional 
gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive (cf. Corfu Channel (United 
Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 17)”, added that it “requires that it be 
fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings, that the crime of genocide or the 
other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed, have been clearly established. The 
same standard applies to the proof of attribution for such acts”. (I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 
129, para. 209.) (ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia 2015: 178). 
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 The three cases being: ICJ, United Kingdom v. Albania 1949; ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia 2007; and ICJ, 
Croatia v. Serbia 2015. 
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11
 Genocide is an international crime because it has been so declared by the international community of 
states in an international treaty. Those states which have adhered to this treaty are in turn bound to 
incorporate this international crime in their national law, enforce it and punish it accordingly. 
12
 The predominant response to addressing disorder caused by operations of violent non-state actors 
(VNSAs) – so far – has been physical, military counter-force with the view of establishing order and an 
official monopoly of force. Virtually absent are law-related responses despite the fact that most VNSAs 
commit offences against all kinds of law, including those related to arms and the use of violence, and 
provisions on human and civil rights. To-date inability to target and “discipline” VNSAs by means of 
inter/national law not only leads to further spirals of lawlessness in so far as activities of these actors are 
concerned but may do deeper and longer-lasting damage than anything that the VNSAs may have inflicted 
directly. For a rare emphasis of this point refer to Bailes and Nord (2010: 441-466).  
